Tower Dumps in North Dakota Criminal Investigations
A tower dump asks a wireless carrier to identify every device that connected to selected cell sites or sectors during a specified interval. Investigators…
Reverse carrier searches, all-device returns, cell sites and sectors, time windows, subscriber identification, innocent users, Stored Communications Act process, probable cause, particularity, minimization, attribution, and suppression
Tower Dumps in North Dakota Criminal Investigations
A tower dump asks a wireless carrier to identify every device that connected to selected cell sites or sectors during a specified interval. Investigators begin with a place and time rather than a known suspect, compare large sets of unknown users, and then seek subscriber or device information for selected records. The method differs technically from a Google-style geofence, but it raises the same constitutional concern: government searches location-linked records belonging mostly to people for whom it had no prior suspicion.
A tower dump is a reverse search of carrier connection records
Traditional CSLI starts with a known phone
In an ordinary historical-CSLI request, investigators identify a number, account, IMSI, or other target and seek its serving-cell records over time. A tower dump reverses the query: it identifies one or more network sites and time windows and asks the carrier for all devices whose retained events matched those parameters.
The return may include far more than a list of numbers
Depending on process and provider, records can include date and time, event type, duration, originating and terminating numbers, IMSI, IMEI, temporary network identifiers, cell and sector, switch, subscriber data, routing, and account fields. Each category presents a separate necessity and particularity question.
Several carriers may require several demands
A crime scene may be served by multiple providers, resellers, roaming partners, and technologies. Seeking only one carrier creates an incomplete population; seeking all carriers substantially expands the number of innocent users. The affidavit should explain carrier selection and avoid implying that the return represents every phone present.
Cell-sector records are not precise coordinates
A sector’s antenna has a general orientation and variable coverage. A phone can connect from outside an investigator’s drawn wedge because of signal quality, terrain, reflection, load, frequency, maintenance, or side and back lobes. The dump identifies network events associated with infrastructure, not exact handset positions.
The provider can return devices outside the crime scene
A serving sector may cover residences, roads, businesses, schools, clinics, farms, and large rural areas beyond the target property. Users outside the investigator’s intended radius can appear because tower coverage is not a clean geographic fence. Maps should show plausible coverage and population, not only a tower pin.
Duplicates and temporary identifiers require careful processing
One device may generate many events, use changing temporary identifiers, switch sectors, or appear through several numbers or account fields. Investigators may deduplicate by a chosen key. That method affects the reported number of users and can mistakenly merge or split devices. Preserve the raw return and transformation code.
The Supreme Court has protected phone-location data but reserved tower dumps
Carpenter requires a warrant for extended historical CSLI
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 309–22 (2018), holds that government acquisition of at least seven days of a person’s historical CSLI is a Fourth Amendment search. The automatic, detailed, retrospective, and pervasive character of cellphone location data created a reasonable expectation of privacy despite carrier possession.
Carpenter expressly did not decide tower dumps
The Court described its decision as narrow and stated that it was not expressing a view on tower dumps, real-time CSLI, conventional surveillance, or other collection techniques. That reservation means neither categorical approval nor categorical invalidation. It requires application of Fourth Amendment principles to the tower-dump method and facts.
Chatrie holds that a reverse-location acquisition can be a search
In Chatrie v. United States, 609 U.S. ___, slip op. at 2, 10, 29–32 (2026), the Court held that government performed a search when it used a geofence warrant to obtain protected Google Location History. The Court required consideration of probable cause and particularity at each stage while leaving the warrant’s ultimate validity and good faith for lower courts.
Chatrie is highly relevant but not technically identical
A historical Google geofence searched centrally stored location estimates and used staged anonymous disclosure. A carrier tower dump searches connection records associated with selected network infrastructure and may disclose numbers or identifiers immediately. The privacy and reverse-identification reasoning is instructive, while the records’ precision, eligible population, and provider processes differ.
The Stored Communications Act provides statutory process
18 U.S.C. § 2703 governs required provider disclosure of communications and records through warrants, court orders, subpoenas, consent, and specified requests. A § 2703(d) order uses a relevance-and-materiality threshold. Constitutional requirements control when the Fourth Amendment demands probable cause and a warrant.
North Dakota Rule 41 governs a state warrant
N.D.R.Crim.P. 41 requires probable cause and particular description and authorizes warrants for electronically stored information. The application should describe the tower-dump operation accurately enough for a magistrate to evaluate the people and data searched, not merely the final evidence investigators hope to find.
Probable cause must justify searching a population of unknown devices
A crime at a place is only the beginning
The fact that an offense occurred near a tower does not show that every device connecting to the tower belongs to an offender, witness, or accomplice. The affidavit should establish why the offender probably carried and used a phone, why that activity likely generated retained records, why selected sectors served the relevant location, and why the interval meaningfully narrows the population.
Evidence of phone use strengthens the device nexus
Surveillance showing the offender using a phone, a victim’s account of a call or message, known remote coordination, a ransom communication, or another observed network event can supply case-specific support. Boilerplate that most people carry phones risks converting ordinary modern behavior into suspicion of everyone.
Tower and sector selection must reflect historical network facts
The affidavit should identify which provider sites and sectors served the scene at the relevant time, the source of that knowledge, and known changes. Selecting the nearest tower from a public map is not enough. A phone may use a more distant site, and the selected sector may cover a large unrelated area.
The interval should track the offense opportunity
Use surveillance, dispatch, access logs, alarms, transactions, witnesses, travel time, and device evidence to define minutes rather than round hours. Longer intervals capture commuters, residents, customers, employees, and passersby. If approach or escape activity is sought, justify the added time distinctly.
Population density affects the inference from presence
A remote site serving a closed facility at 3 a.m. differs from a Fargo sector serving apartments, hospitals, shops, roads, and businesses at noon. Estimate the innocent population and expected network traffic. A high false-positive burden weakens the inference that appearing in the return indicates involvement.
Presence near a target does not establish individualized cause
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91–96 (1979), rejected searches of every tavern patron based on a warrant concerning the premises and bartender. Tower records are different from physical pat-downs, but Ybarra reinforces that proximity alone does not transfer probable cause from a place or suspect to every person nearby.
Later cross-matching needs its own justification
Investigators may compare dumps from several scenes and focus on devices appearing in more than one. That analysis searches associations across additional people, dates, and places. The warrant should disclose planned cross-comparison, define the scenes and criteria, and explain why a repeated device is probably evidence rather than a resident, worker, delivery driver, or first responder.
North Dakota requires a nexus between evidence and the search
State v. Leavitt, 2015 ND 146, ¶¶ 5–9, permits circumstantial evidence to establish nexus but requires facts supporting a fair probability that evidence will be found in the searched place. A tower dump needs a factual chain from offender to phone, network event, selected infrastructure, time, returned data, and evidentiary use.
Particularity should limit infrastructure, time, events, fields, and later use
Name the providers, towers, and sectors
A warrant for all records from every tower “near” a scene delegates the search boundaries to officers or carriers. It should identify provider, site, sector where supported, coordinates, technology, and effective configuration. Maps and provider diagrams should be incorporated clearly.
Limit event types
Voice, SMS, data sessions, registrations, handoffs, control-channel events, emergency calls, and idle-state records can sweep different populations. Seek only the event categories supported by facts and available from the provider. If all network events are required, explain why narrower connection records are inadequate.
Separate anonymous identifiers from subscriber disclosure
Where technically available, a staged process can produce limited device identifiers first and require judicial approval before subscriber names, addresses, payment, and account history. Staging does not cure missing probable cause, but it can reduce immediate exposure and preserve neutral review.
Set objective narrowing rules
Criteria might include occurrence within a tightly supported interval, connection to the sector serving the scene, presence at multiple linked scenes, exclusion of known emergency responders, or consistency with observed travel. The magistrate should approve the rules before officers see identities rather than accept an assurance that investigators will “narrow” later.
Limit cross-scene comparisons
A warrant for one incident should not silently authorize comparison against every prior dump or intelligence database. Identify which scenes, intervals, providers, identifiers, and databases may be compared, how matches will be handled, and when identities may be sought.
Address innocent-user retention
The warrant or protective order can require segregation, access controls, audit logs, non-disclosure, prompt deletion or return of nonresponsive records, and a prohibition on unrelated investigative use. Retaining a permanent list of everyone near a clinic, school, workplace, or political event magnifies the intrusion.
Protect sensitive places and privileged activity
Sectors can encompass homes, hospitals, legal offices, treatment facilities, religious gatherings, shelters, schools, and protest activity. Identify these sites in the application and consider exclusion, narrower time, different sectors, staged review, filter procedures, or judicial supervision.
The warrant—not an unincorporated application—sets the limits
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557–63 (2004), held a warrant facially deficient where it omitted the things to be seized despite detail in the application. Tower, sector, time, event, data-field, and narrowing limits should appear in or be validly incorporated into the signed warrant served on each provider.
The return is a network log, not a census of everyone present
Only devices generating retained events appear
A phone can be present but idle, off, in airplane mode, out of coverage, connected through Wi-Fi, roaming, or using an over-the-top application without generating the requested carrier record. A tower dump includes only devices and events captured by the provider and legal process.
A device can appear while outside the target area
Coverage extends irregularly. Terrain, antenna orientation, power, frequency, buildings, reflection, load, interference, maintenance, and device capability affect service. The return may include users miles from a rural scene or across a river, highway, neighborhood, or state line.
The closest-tower assumption is unreliable
Cellular systems select a usable network resource, not necessarily the geographically nearest site. The nearest tower may point away, be blocked, operate on another band, be congested, or be unavailable. Historical provider configuration is more reliable than public tower maps.
Event timestamps need provider-specific interpretation
Time may represent initiation, connection, routing, message processing, termination, billing, or export. Records can use UTC, local time, or switch time. Verify daylight-saving offsets, duration, and whether the event overlaps the offense rather than assuming the timestamp describes a continuous presence.
Temporary identifiers can change within the interval
Networks use IMSI, IMEI, phone numbers, temporary mobile identifiers, and other fields. A device may change temporary values; a number may move between SIMs or devices; roaming may change what the home carrier sees. Provider expertise is needed to deduplicate correctly.
Callers and recipients can appear for different reasons
A record may reflect the serving site for one side, routing information for another, or both depending on the carrier. The fact that a phone number appears in a row does not automatically mean its handset used the selected tower. Field definitions and sample validation are essential.
Maps must show coverage uncertainty
A tower pin and colored wedge can falsely suggest a precise boundary. Analysts should disclose azimuth, beamwidth assumptions, side and back lobes, terrain, site height, downtilt, technology, and absence of measured historical coverage. The correct conclusion is often only that the record is consistent with service by a broad sector.
Cross-carrier returns may not be comparable
Providers use different field names, event generation, retention, clocks, identifiers, tower tables, and export practices. Combining several carrier spreadsheets requires normalization that can introduce error. Preserve the original files, transformation rules, excluded rows, and quality-control results.
How officers narrow a tower dump is part of the search
Deduplication choices affect the population
Investigators may collapse rows by phone number, IMSI, IMEI, subscriber, or temporary ID. Each choice answers a different question and can miscount shared devices, dual-SIM phones, ported numbers, roaming users, or repeated network events. Report both raw rows and unique identifiers by method.
Known-user exclusion can conceal inconsistent application
Employees, residents, customers, first responders, delivery drivers, and witnesses may be removed as “explained.” Preserve how each identity was learned and what evidence justified exclusion. Similar treatment should apply to the eventual suspect; a label should not replace neutral criteria.
Multiple-scene matching can generate false positives
A repeated identifier may belong to a utility employee, carrier technician, delivery route, commuter, police officer, nearby resident, or business device. Calculate the size of each population, overlap expected by chance, common coverage, and whether matching relied on broad sites rather than actual scene proximity.
Subscriber information is not user identity
Family plans, employers, prepaid accounts, resellers, inaccurate registrations, and porting mean the named subscriber may not possess the phone. Investigators should corroborate device user through possession, surveillance, account activity, messages, witnesses, and other independent evidence.
Later surveillance can be confirmation-biased
Once a number is selected, officers may interpret ordinary conduct as suspicious and overlook alternative users. Preserve the full candidate list, elimination notes, negative checks, and contrary evidence. Defense review should test whether the same criteria would have selected innocent devices.
Identity disclosure can lead to a derivative evidence chain
A tower-dump match may produce subscriber subpoenas, database searches, surveillance, phone and home warrants, interviews, arrest, and confession. Build a step-by-step genealogy. If the original warrant or narrowing stage was unlawful, later evidence requires independent-source, attenuation, inevitable-discovery, and taint analysis.
Provider overproduction does not authorize review
A carrier may return extra sectors, fields, times, or users because of system design or error. Investigators should segregate excess and seek judicial guidance. The government cannot treat every delivered row as within scope merely because the carrier included it.
A tower-dump lead is not automatically admissible proof
The proponent must authenticate the records actually offered
A carrier spreadsheet does not become self-proving simply because police received it in response to legal process. Under N.D.R.Ev. 901(a), the proponent must offer evidence sufficient to support a finding that an exhibit is what the proponent claims. That foundation should identify the provider, system, relevant fields, extraction, delivery, and any later transformation. A certification may supply part of the foundation for qualifying electronic evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 902(11), (13), or (14), but a certification does not explain an analyst’s undocumented filtering decisions or prove that a subscriber personally carried the device.
Business-record status and authorship are separate questions
A provider may establish that its network generated and retained connection logs in the regular course of business. That proposition concerns the record, not the identity of the human who used the handset during a particular event. Subscriber name, billing responsibility, possession, account sharing, family plans, borrowed phones, vehicle occupants, and automated device activity must not be collapsed into one inference. The defense should require the State to prove each inferential step instead of allowing a carrier label to substitute for authorship.
A summary or map must fairly represent the underlying data
Investigators often present a map, timeline, candidate table, or selected-row exhibit rather than thousands of raw records. Counsel should compare that demonstrative with the native return and ask who chose the coordinates, coverage shapes, labels, colors, and exclusions. N.D.R.Ev. 1006 permits a summary of voluminous admissible material when the underlying materials are made available, but it does not authorize an advocate to hide contradictory rows or depict an uncertain radio sector as a precise location boundary.
Completeness matters when the State offers only selected events
A few matching connections can look compelling when separated from the device’s full activity. Earlier and later records may show a routine commute, a residence outside the depicted sector, a second device moving with the accused, or events inconsistent with the prosecution’s theory. Other carrier returns may reveal that hundreds of devices produced the same apparent match. The defense should seek the complete interval, definitions for every field, excluded candidates, and the analyst’s working files so the jury sees the evidence in its proper technical and factual context.
Expert testimony cannot manufacture geographic precision
Under N.D.R.Ev. 702, technical opinions require sufficient facts and reliable methods reliably applied. A witness should disclose whether the opinion concerns a recorded sector, a modeled coverage area, a drive test, historical network configuration, or merely the tower’s plotted address. The word “located” can overstate what a network event proves. Cross-examination should separate a device’s connection to equipment from an opinion about the handset’s exact position, the user’s identity, and the user’s awareness or purpose.
Unfairly precise graphics may require exclusion or limitation
N.D.R.Ev. 403 permits exclusion when unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury substantially outweighs probative value. A dot placed on the crime scene, a sharply bounded wedge, or an animation of supposed travel can communicate certainty that the raw records do not contain. Appropriate relief may include a limiting instruction, revised legend, disclosure of scale and uncertainty, removal of unsupported coordinates, or exclusion of a demonstrative that cannot be reconciled with the provider evidence.
Attribution requires evidence independent of the reverse search
At trial, the decisive question is frequently not whether an identifier appeared, but who possessed and used the associated device at the relevant time. Legitimate attribution evidence may include possession when seized, account records, device contents, communications, witness observations, synchronized applications, or other corroboration. Each item has its own foundation and possible innocent explanation. A tower-dump match may justify investigation; standing alone, it usually cannot answer every identity, intent, and participation question the charged offense requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defense counsel should reconstruct the population search from raw data
Obtain the entire legal-process chain
Request preservation letters, warrants, applications, affidavits, recorded testimony, § 2703(d) orders, subpoenas, maps, attachments, provider service records, correspondence, returns, inventories, nondisclosure orders, staged requests, subscriber process, and derivative warrants. Identify which authority produced each field.
Demand native returns and transformation materials
Seek original provider files, hashes, field guides, tower and sector lists with effective dates, time-zone instructions, subscriber tables, temporary-identifier documentation, deduplication scripts, database queries, spreadsheets, formulas, excluded records, candidate lists, maps, audit logs, and analyst notes.
Build a scope and population table
For each carrier and stage, record sites, sectors, time, events, fields, raw rows, unique devices by identifier, subscribers disclosed, users eliminated, criteria, sensitive places, officers with access, retention, and later use. Compare each item with the signed warrant.
Use experts for network and data analysis where needed
A qualified expert can explain carrier architecture, event fields, identifiers, sector coverage, deduplication, cross-carrier normalization, false-positive rates, and mapping. Under N.D.R.Ev. 702, opinions must rest on sufficient facts and reliable methods applied reliably.
Consider a Franks hearing
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 171–72 (1978), permits a hearing after the required showing of a material intentional or reckless affidavit falsehood. Tower-dump candidates include misrepresented coverage, omitted population, false precision, incomplete carrier selection, inaccurate phone-use claims, and hidden expansion.
Address good faith without conceding validity
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914–23 (1984), recognizes a federal good-faith exception with limits. Carpenter’s reservation, Chatrie’s 2026 search holding, warrant timing, affidavit candor, facial breadth, magistrate involvement, and execution excess all bear on objectively reasonable reliance.
File a specific Rule 12 motion
N.D.R.Crim.P. 12 generally requires suppression issues before trial when reasonably available. Identify the unlawful acquisition or stage, deficient cause, missing particularity, provider overproduction, narrowing discretion, affected records, subscriber disclosure, later fruits, and requested findings.
Frequently asked questions about tower dumps
What is a tower dump?
It is a reverse carrier-record request for all devices that generated specified network events through selected cell sites or sectors during a defined time.
Is a tower dump the same as CSLI for a suspect?
No. Ordinary CSLI begins with a known phone and retrieves its history. A tower dump begins with infrastructure and returns many unknown devices for later identification.
Is a tower dump the same as a geofence?
No. Historical Google geofences used provider location estimates within a drawn perimeter. Tower dumps use carrier network connections to selected sites or sectors. Both are reverse-location techniques.
Did Carpenter decide whether tower dumps require warrants?
No. Carpenter expressly reserved tower dumps. It does establish strong privacy protection for extended historical CSLI and rejects automatic third-party-doctrine treatment.
What does Chatrie add?
Chatrie holds that acquiring protected phone-location data through a reverse geofence is a search and requires stage-specific probable cause and particularity analysis. Its technology differs from tower dumps.
Does appearing in a tower dump prove presence at the scene?
No. A sector can serve a broad and irregular area, including places outside the scene. The record shows a network event associated with infrastructure, not an exact device coordinate.
Will every phone at the scene appear?
No. A phone may be idle, off, on Wi-Fi, roaming, using another provider, or generating no retained requested event. A dump is not a census.
Does the nearest tower always handle the phone?
No. Network selection depends on signal quality, antenna direction, terrain, load, interference, frequency, maintenance, and device capability.
Can one sector cover homes and businesses outside the target?
Yes. Real coverage is broad and irregular, particularly in rural areas. The application should disclose affected roads, residences, businesses, and sensitive sites.
What is staged disclosure?
The provider may first return limited or pseudonymous device identifiers, followed by subscriber information only for a judicially approved subset. Staging reduces exposure but does not cure missing cause.
Why do narrowing rules matter?
Undefined officer discretion can determine whose movements and identity are exposed after the magistrate signs the warrant. Objective criteria should be approved in advance and preserved.
Can police compare dumps from several crimes?
They may seek authority to do so, but comparison expands the search and false-positive risk. The scenes, populations, criteria, databases, and identification rules should be disclosed and limited.
Does the subscriber name identify the phone user?
No. Family, business, prepaid, shared, ported, and resold phones require independent evidence of who possessed or used the device.
What if the carrier provides more records than the warrant requested?
Overproduction does not expand authority. Investigators should segregate excess material and obtain judicial guidance before review or use.
What supports a Franks challenge?
Material intentional or reckless statements or omissions about coverage, precision, phone use, time, population, carrier completeness, sensitive sites, narrowing, or planned comparisons can support the required showing.
Does good faith always prevent suppression?
No. Leon identifies limits. Warrant timing, legal precedent, affidavit candor, facial breadth, judicial involvement, and execution beyond authorization matter.
What discovery should the defense request?
Every legal instrument, native carrier return, field guide, historical tower list, time instructions, raw candidate population, subscriber data, scripts, formulas, exclusions, maps, audit logs, provider correspondence, and derivative warrants.
When should a North Dakota challenge be filed?
Rule 12 generally requires a pretrial suppression motion when the basis is reasonably available. Seek sealed process and native data early and request leave to supplement after production.